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Algorithmic Pollution: Making the Invisible Visible 
 
“We have become accustomed to thinking of pollution exclusively in terms of 
environmental degradation. This approach so pervades the societal mindset that 
people often dismiss references to cultural pollution, light pollution, spiritual 
pollution, and other nonenvironmental pollution as a mere rhetorical device … 
Pollution has always had dual meanings: a broad reference to all sorts of effects 
upon human environments, and a narrow focus upon natural environments. In fact, 
until less than a century ago society applied the term to human environment more 
often than natural environment” (Nagle, 2009, p.6).   
 
Abstract  
In this paper, we focus on the growing evidence of unintended harmful societal effects of automated 
algorithmic decision-making (AADM) in transformative services (e.g., social welfare, healthcare, 
education, policing and criminal justice), for individuals, communities and society at large. Drawing 
from the long-established research on social pollution, in particular its contemporary ‘pollution-as-
harm’ notion, we put forward a claim - and provide evidence - that these harmful effects constitute a 
new type of digital social pollution, which we name ‘algorithmic pollution’. Words do matter, and by 
using the term ‘pollution’, not as a metaphor or an analogy, but as a transformative redefinition of 
the digital harm performed by AADM, we seek to make it visible and recognized. By adopting a 
critical performative perspective, we explain how the execution of AADM produces harm and thus 
performs algorithmic pollution. Recognition of the potential for unintended harmful effects of 
algorithmic pollution, and their examination as such, leads us to articulate the need for 
transformative actions to prevent, detect, redress, mitigate, and educate about algorithmic harm. 
These actions, in turn, open up new research challenges for the information systems community.  
   
1. Introduction 
The widespread adoption of automated decision-making algorithms (AADM1), powered by AI, 
analytics, and big data, in human services in sectors vital for any society – such as social welfare, 
education, healthcare, employment, public housing, policing and criminal justice – is motivated and 
justified by intended and expected positive effects. These include, for example, increased efficiency 
and speed of service delivery, better compliance with government policies, greater transparency and 
accountability, reduction of costs and, most importantly for service beneficiaries, improved overall 
service quality (Redden, 2018; Caplan et al. 2018; Alston, 2019a, 2019b; Park and Humphry, 2019). 
However, in spite of positive intentions, there is growing and disturbing evidence of the harmful 
societal effects of AADM (see for example O’Neil, 2016a; Eubanks, 2018; Caplan, et al., 2018; Park 
and Humphry, 2019; Benjamin, 2019; Alston, 2019a, 2020; UN, 2020). Moreover, unintended 
harmful effects on citizens, students, patients, employees, and other intended beneficiaries of these 
services, continue to spread through systems of algorithms (Pasquale, 2015) and be amplified in 
unknowable ways through ongoing datafication practices (Galliers, et al., 2017; Marjanovic and 
Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2017). These effects, however, remain largely invisible (Eubanks, 2018; Caplan, 
et al. 2018; Benjamin, 2019). Worryingly, they are often dismissed in the literature as unintended, 
and sometimes even inevitable ‘transactional side effects’ (Markus, 2015). As a result, they have been 
neither thoroughly examined nor effectively addressed.  
This paper is motivated by our critical concerns for the wellbeing of individuals and communities 
that continue to experience the harmful effects of fully automated algorithmic decision-making. As 
researchers, we feel responsible for making these harmful effects visible and recognized and to act as 
a catalyst for transformation (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). Taking a critical research perspective 
(Alvesson and Deetz, 2000; Myers and Klein, 2011), we seek to provide insights into these harmful 
effects and propose a transformative redefinition that has the potential to address the social and 
technological arrangements that produce them. The objectives of this paper therefore are to: 
i) offer critical insights into the new digital forms of harmful social effects performed by 
automated algorithmic decision-making (AADM), based on the literature; 
ii) articulate and theorize the new phenomenon of algorithmic pollution as a digital type of 
social pollution, which we put forward as a transformative redefinition of these unintended 
harmful effects; 
iii) propose transformative actions to prevent, detect, redress, mitigate, and educate about 
algorithmic harm, based on our sociomaterial theorisation of algorithmic pollution, along 
with the identification of associated IS research challenges. 
To achieve our objectives, we first draw on a broad IS and social science literature as well as 
various government reports and algorithmic primers, to provide critical insights (Alvesson and Deetz, 
2000) into the reported harmful effects of automated algorithmic decision-making and its associated 
datafication practices. We focus on the domain of human services (also called transformative 
services), such as those offered in the areas of social welfare, education, healthcare, criminal justice, 
housing, and employment. These services are considered to be vital for any society as they have a 
direct transformative impact on the wellbeing of individuals, their families, communities, and society 
at large (Anderson and Ostrom, 2015; Anderson et al., 2018). 
 
1 In this paper we use the following definition of AADM from the information commissioner in the UK: “Automated 
decision-making is the process of making a decision by automated means without any human involvement. These 
decisions can be based on factual data, as well as on digitally created profiles or inferred data. Examples of this include: 
an online decision to award a loan; and an aptitude test used for recruitment which uses pre-programmed algorithms 
and criteria. Automated decision-making often involves profiling, but it does not have to.” (ICO, 2018, p.7). 
 
Based on these critical insights we demonstrate that the harmful effects on individual and collective 
wellbeing constitute a new form of digital harm. We name this harm algorithmic pollution.  
To articulate and justify the notion of algorithmic pollution, we draw from the long-established 
research on social pollution, see for example Norman (2004), Nagle (2009), Sarine (2012) and others, 
which is based on an anthropological notion of ‘pollution’ (Douglas, 1966, 1969, 1975). As Nagle 
(2009) explains, the concepts of social and moral pollution appeared in the research literature and 
practice of law long before environmental pollution. Social pollution focuses on pollution as harm to 
individuals, communities and societies, rather than environmental pollution and the discharge of 
harmful particles. 
Thus, taking an outside-in perspective (Deville and van der Velden, 2016), we define algorithmic 
pollution as a new kind of social pollution manifested as digital harm performed by automated 
algorithmic decision making (AADM). We frame algorithmic pollution as a phenomenon in the 
sociomaterial environment, defined as the entanglement of humans and technologies (and other non-
humans), discourses and materialities, which perform the social and how the social is done (Gherardi, 
2019). Enacted in the sociomaterial environment, AADM performs algorithmic pollution through 
material-discursive practices in which the human/social are co-constituted through technology (Law, 
2004; Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowski and Scott, 2008) often in invisible ways.  
Our critical research perspective is, therefore, informed by a performative view of sociomateriality 
(Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 2014; Introna, 2019; Orlikowski, 2007). More precisely, we take a critical 
performative perspective. Such a perspective leads us to theorize algorithmic pollution by questioning 
first the assumption that AADM technologies exist separately from human beings – subjects of 
decision-making – and then that they ‘affect’ them as intended, in a pre-determined, desirable manner. 
Instead, we argue that to understand algorithmic pollution, that is the harmful social effects of AADM 
technologies, it is necessary to understand what their execution actually does “not just empirically, 
but also ontologically” (Introna, 2019, 316, emphasis in the original). In other words, we need to 
understand how these technologies perform the subjects about which they acquire data and use 
‘datafied individuals’ to make decisions that determine their possibilities to be. Our critical 
performative perspective is therefore grounded in an ontology of becoming that assumes 
inseparability of the human/social and the material/technological in an ongoing process or flow that 
is never complete (Barad, 2007; Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2016; Introna, 2019). Such a critical 
performative perspective allows us to expose an ongoing flow of performing the subjects in the image 
inscribed in the AADM technologies. As decisions are made, the subjects become what the AADM 
technologies assume they are (Introna, 2019). This is how harm is done. In other words, by revealing 
the ontological assumptions underlying AADM we demonstrate how their execution is ontological, 
performing the subjects and thus producing, propagating and amplifying harmful effects, which often 
remain invisible. 
Based on such a critical performative theorizing concerning how algorithmic pollution is 
performed, we then discuss possible transformative actions (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000; Myers and 
Klein, 2011) of prevention, detection, redress and mitigation of, and education about algorithmic 
pollution. As critical IS researchers, we see these actions, and the research challenges they entail, not 
only as an interesting direction for IS research, but also as an integral part of our shared societal 
responsibility for urgent research-informed collective action to address algorithmic pollution. 
Further, words do matter, especially in the public discourse. By giving the concept of algorithmic 
pollution a name, not as a metaphor or an analogy, but as a transformative redefinition (Alvesson and 
Deetz 2000) of the harmful effects of AADM, we seek to make these harms visible and recognised. 
In doing this we also issue a call for research-informed action that we, the IS research community, 
are well positioned to inform and lead. 
The main theoretical contributions of our research are: 1) articulation of the new concept of 
algorithmic pollution as a new form of social pollution that presents a transformative redefinition of 
unintended harmful effects of automated algorithmic decision-making; 2) a theoretical elaboration of 
algorithmic pollution that explains how automated decision-making performs harm in the 
sociomaterial environment; and 3) setting the research foundations for an agenda of transformative 
actions.  
The main practical contributions come from naming and making algorithmic pollution visible not 
only for researchers, but also for developers, users, regulators, and the general public, in order to 
inform, inspire and mobilise broader changes. By using the term ‘pollution’ – something we can all 
relate to – we also signal it as harmful and in need of urgent attention and regulation. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the domain of transformative services 
and review relevant literature on the harmful effects of AADM and the underlying datafication 
practices. In Section 3 we introduce and define the concept of algorithmic pollution, building upon 
the multidisciplinary literature of social pollution (which was long established before the 
contemporary and familiar notion of environmental pollution). In Section 4 we elaborate further on 
the concept of algorithmic pollution through a critical performative perspective and explain how 
algorithmic harm is performed in the sociomaterial environment. This forms the basis for proposing 
transformative actions needed to prevent, detect, redress and mitigate algorithmic harm, together with 
identifying the associated IS research challenges, in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we offer some 
concluding remarks, reflect on the limitations of our research and discuss possible ways forward. 
 
2. Foundation Concepts and Related work 
2.1. Transformative services  
The emerging multidisciplinary field of Transformative Services Research (TSR) focuses on services 
that transform human lives by having a direct impact on the wellbeing of individuals, communities 
and the wider society (Anderson, et al., 2013; Ostrom et al., 2015; Anderson and Ostrom, 2015). 
Well-known examples of transformative services include various social and other human care 
services in contexts such as social welfare, housing, healthcare, aged-care, employment, and 
education (Anderson et al., 2013; Anderson and Ostrom, 2015; Danaher and Gallan, 2016; Anderson, 
et al., 2018). Importantly, the very nature of these services is directly related to the wellbeing of the 
intended service beneficiaries (e.g., patients, students, citizens), because of their direct and profound 
impact on human wellbeing outcomes, such as health, livelihood, access, inclusion and, ultimately, 
human dignity and human rights – both at individual and collective levels (Anderson et al., 2013). 
Indeed, calling upon the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Anderson at al. 
(2013) describe the “moral imperative” of transformative services “founded on the concept of human 
dignity, which advances the development of rights and responsibilities” (p.1203). 
Research shows that transformative services are increasingly supported by AADM, powered by 
AI, big data and analytics. Various examples found in a multidisciplinary literature show that this 
type of technology is being adopted all over the world at “breath-taking speed”, as Eubanks (2018, 
p,11) warns. Important decisions are now made by fully automated algorithms in vital societal 
services in social welfare, housing, healthcare, education, criminal justice, and employment (Colins 
et al., 2018). These algorithms are used, for example, to predict “children at risk” in children and 
family services in New Zealand and the USA, to calculate citizen scores used for predictive policing 
and criminal sentencing in the criminal justice services, to select and score suitable and promising 
candidates in employment services, to determine eligibility and access to social welfare payments in 
digital welfare systems, to manage priority lists in housing services, and in many other domains 
(Pasquale, 2015; O’Neil 2016; Wachter-Boettcher, 2017; Noble, 2018; Caplan et al. 2018; Eubanks, 
2018; Alston, 2019a, 2019b; Marda, 2019, Zalnieriute et al, 2019). The intended beneficiaries of 
AADM are often the most vulnerable groups in society – groups who depend on provision of these 
services for their health, wellbeing, livelihood, access and, ultimately, human dignity and human 
rights.  
Even without AADM, decision-making in transformative services is extremely complex and with 
high stake outcomes, due to highly contested aims, political issues, institutional mechanisms, 
ideological underpinnings, and even institutional and societal value systems (Eubanks, 2018; 
Keddell, 2019; Zavrsnik, 2019). For example, Keddell (2019) illustrates the complexities of the 
institutional system of child protection: “Whether a child protection system is based on a child 
protection-, child welfare-, or child-focussed policy orientation, for example, will shape its 
philosophical basis, broad institutional structures, preferred priorities and methods of social work 
practice” (p.2). In other words, the institutional system of child protection itself could be punitive or, 
instead, focused on providing support. This in turn, influences both decision-making and its 
outcomes. For example, “[t]o be offered a voluntary, in-home support service or better housing has 
different ramifications than being investigated for child abuse” (Keddell, 2019, p.5). As this example 
illustrates, decision making in transformative services includes unique ethical and moral challenges, 
which are made even more complex through the use of AADM (Zavrsnik, 2019; Eubanks, 2018, 
Keddell, 2019; Sun and Gerchick, 2019). 
Research in IS has only recently recognised the unintended harmful consequences of AI and 
AADM (Galliers et al., 2017; Markus, 2017; Schultze et al., 2018; Bohme, 2019; Cecez-Kecmanovic, 
2019; Clarke, 2019a; 2019b; Leidner, 2019; March, 2019; Gal et al., 2020), but it is yet to consider 
the context of transformative services. The transformative services literature, on the other hand, has 
identified the use of AI and automated algorithmic decision-making as “gnarly issues” in wellbeing 
and service research (Blocker and Davis, 2019). Both IS and transformative services researchers 
agree that the unintended negative and harmful consequences of AADM (Blocker and Davis, 2019; 
Mikalef et al. 2019) are of critical social concern and in urgent need of our attention. 
 
2.2. Harmful effects of automated algorithmic decision-making 
Without any doubt the intentions behind AADM are positive. As the information commissioner in 
the UK explains: “Profiling and automated decision making can be very useful for organisations and 
also benefit individuals in many sectors, including healthcare, education, financial services and 
marketing. They can lead to quicker and more consistent decisions, particularly in cases where a very 
large volume of data needs to be analysed and decisions made very quickly” (ICO, 2018, p.7). Despite 
positive intentions behind the adoption of algorithmic decision-making in transformative services, 
AADM comes with significant risks and unintended harmful effects for individuals, their families, 
and wider communities. For example, the ICO (2020) identifies the following risks of AADM: “i) 
Profiling is often invisible to individuals; ii) People might not expect their personal information to be 
used in this way; iii) People might not understand how the process works or how it can affect them; 
and iv) the decisions taken may lead to significant adverse effects for some people” (p.8). 
The related literature reports growing evidence of unintended harmful effects. They include 
restricted access to services, digital exclusion and other forms of ‘digital discrimination’ and 
‘technological redlining’ (Caplan et al., 2018:3; Eubanks, 2018; Noble 2018). AADM are also found 
to further amplify en masse existing inequalities and other systemic issues, such as poverty and 
discrimination (Caplan et al., 2018; Noble, 2018; Alston, 2019a, 2019b; Marda, 2019). Seeing 
algorithmic harm as a human-rights issue, Marda (2019) explains: “It is not simply a matter of 
ensuring accuracy and perfection in a technical system, but rather a reckoning with the fundamentally 
imperfect, discriminatory and unfair world from which these systems arise, and the underlying 
structural and historical legacy in which these systems are applied” (p.8).  
Unregulated and often hidden and invisible, AADM systems continue to create these harmful 
effects without anyone taking responsibility or being identified as responsible (O’Neil, 2016; 
Eubanks, 2017; Caplan et al., 2018; Alston, 2019a, 2019b). With the intended beneficiaries of AADM 
often being the most vulnerable members of society, these algorithms, Eubanks (2018:11) warns, are 
fast becoming “the new tools for digital poverty management”, sometimes with life-threatening 
consequences (Eubanks, 2018; Carney, 2018; Zalnieriute et al., 2019). 
There are a few notable IS studies that focus on the harmful effects of AI and automated 
algorithmic decision-making on individuals, organisations and society – see for example Loebbecke 
and Picot (2015), Newell and Mirabelli, (2015), Zuboff (2015, Galliers et al. (2017), Markus (2017),  
Schultze et al. (2018), Clarke (2019a; 2019b), Cecez-Kecmanovic (2019), Bohme (2019), Leidner 
(2019), March (2019) and Gal et al. (2020), However, the IS research community is yet to focus on 
this important topic on a larger scale and explain how unintended harmful effects of AADM are 
created. Moreover, as Mikalef et al. (2019) observe, “[m]ainstream information systems research 
generally celebrates the proliferation of analytics and AI”, and is yet to focus on the “dark side of AI 
and big data” (pg. 1). In this context, it is of note that critical IS research is conspicuously missing.  
While it remains unclear how algorithms create harmful effects, the related literature points to the 
role of underlying datafication practices (Galliers et al., 2017, Markus, 2017). The role of datafication 
in the context of AADM is reviewed next. 
 
2.3. Datafication and automated algorithmic decision-making 
At the very core of algorithmic decision-making are several - often hidden - mechanisms of 
datafication, which are enacted as algorithms use and produce data. Datafication (also known as 
datification) is a process of representing various phenomena (including people) by data (Lycett, 2013; 
Newell and Mirabelli, 2015; Galliers et al., 2017; Markus, 2017). While we recognise that 
datafication may have positive effects (Lycett, 2013), in this section we focus on datafication 
practices in transformative services and how those practices, in the context of AADM, can cause 
harm. 
The algorithmic primers, published by Data & Society (n.d) in collaboration with practitioners 
offer illustrative examples of datafication used in AADM and the resulting algorithmic harm in 
various transformative service sectors, such as healthcare (Rosenblat et al., 2014a), public housing 
(Rosenblat et al., 2014b), employment (Rosenblat et al., 2014c), criminal justice (Rosenblat et al., 
2014d), and education (Alarconn, et al., 2014). Further evidence of algorithmic harm is provided by 
influential government and other public reports (Caplan, et al., 2018; Redden, 2018; Alston et al., 
2019a, 2019b; Marada et al. 2019; UN 2020). By combining this evidence with related research 
literature from social sciences and IS, we identify the following datafication practices and their 
harmful effects. 
- Use of proxy, inferred and unrelated data to describe an individual 
Algorithms are applied to ‘datafied individuals’ that is, individuals are represented by a limited 
number of attributes that are chosen as relevant in the context of a particular transformative service. 
However, what constitutes “relevant” data remains highly problematic (Caplan et al., 2018; Alston, 
et al., 2019a, 2019b) as it often includes proxy, inferred and even unrelated data. For example, in 
criminal justice a person’s postcode may be augmented with additional “proxy data” such as “crime 
hot spots” which are then used to determine the length of their sentence (Rosenblat et al., 2014d; 
Caplan et al., 2018). In another reported example, the hiring algorithm Evolv uses the distance 
between an employee’s workplace and residential postcode to infer their intention of staying in the 
job (Rosenblat et al., 2014c). Those who live 0-5 miles from their workplace are predicted to stay in 
their jobs 20% longer, regardless of many other more compelling reasons why people may stay or 
leave their jobs. When not available, personal data may be inferred from other data. For example, a 
person’s health or criminal status may be inferred in part from a relative’s medical status (Rosenblat 
et al., 2014a:1) or a relative’s past criminal record (Rosenblat et al., 2014d; Ferguson, 2017).  
Inferred and unrelated data have also been widely used in business by marketers when selling 
products or services to targeted customers. Although the consequences of such practices may appear 
low-stake (for instance, products being recommended to a particular customer, based on their datafied 
profile, are not sold or advertisements are not shown to the most profitable customers) the result is 
the yet further datafication of individuals. However, in the case of transformative services, such 
datafication practices of using proxy, inferred, and unrelated data result in so-called “representational 
harm”, which can have long-lasting and unknowable future consequences (Reisman et al., 2018). 
Inaccurate inferences may have serious, even tragic consequences, for example, for people needing 
access to healthcare (Rosenblat et al., 2014a), including life-saving medical services (Eubanks, 2018). 
- Use of poor-quality historic data to train algorithms 
Algorithms are trained using past data about (datafied) individuals to predict their future behaviour 
and make related decisions. Such datafication practices are highly problematic for several reasons. 
First, past data may be outdated. For example, data collected on historical “gang districts” are now 
used by police for predictive policing even though these districts may no longer be representative 
(Ferguson, 2017). Similarly, past assumptions about traits (data values) that correlate with crime, 
which are no longer considered valid, may continue to be reflected in discriminatory outcomes of the 
algorithms trained on such data (Rosenblat et al., 2014d).  
Second, various biases contained in past data will lead to more biases in the algorithmic outcomes. 
For example, “[w]hen algorithms rely on the characteristics of convicted or arrested populations to 
predict the persons who are likely to commit crime, they solidify a history of bias against those 
already disproportionately targeted by the criminal justice system” (Rosenblat et al., 2014d:2-3). As 
O’Neil (2016:1) observes: “if we allowed a model to be used for college admissions in 1870, we’d 
still have 0.7% of women going to college. Thank goodness we didn’t have big data back then”. 
These datafication practices of using past data can create harmful effects, whereby past 
disadvantages are reinforced and a history of bias is further solidified. Over time, they create harmful 
effects known as “cumulative disadvantage” (Rosenblat et al., 2014d). 
- Further datafication through scoring and ranking 
Individual scores and ranks are very common algorithmic outputs found across all types of 
transformative services. These scores/ranks are used to determine outcomes, to offer (or not offer) 
services, or to predict future behavior. For example, citizen scores can be used to unlawfully arrest 
predicted ‘future criminals’, before they even commit any crime (Rosenblat et al., 2014d; Ferguson, 
2017; Caplan et al., 2018). The resulting harmful effects are long lasting and affect individuals, 
families, neighbourhoods and whole communities.  
Yet, the ways these scores and ranks are calculated and used is invisible and as such very hard to 
challenge and change. For example, almost 400,000 Chicago citizens have an official police risk score 
of which they are not aware (Ferguson, 2017). Moreover, “[t]his algorithm – still secret and publicly 
unaccountable – shapes policing strategy, the use of force, and threatens to alter suspicion on the 
streets. It is also the future of big data policing in America – and depending on how you see it, either 
an innovative approach to violence reduction or a terrifying example of data-driven social control”. 
(Ferguson, 2017:1) 
Algorithmic outcomes of scoring and ranking result in further datafication of already datafied 
individuals. Thus, patients become high-risk patients, students are identified as future failures, 
employees become bad employees, and so on. Being more than labels, these scores and ranks start to 
perform new worlds for future service encounters with the same providers and beyond. 
- Networked harm resulting from cumulative datafication practices across different contexts 
Algorithmic outputs are further propagated through systems of algorithms and consequently 
reused in new contexts for different (unknowable) purposes, both across transformative services and 
beyond. These society-wide datafication practices result in data about individuals being perpetually 
reconstructed (Cheney-Lippold, 2018) in unknowable ways. The harmful effects experienced in one 
context, are propagated and further amplified throughout subsequent services, with long lasting and 
unknowable cumulative effects. For example, educational data are already used, or have a potential 
to be reused, in other contexts. As stated in the Education Primer (Alarconn, et al., 2014:5) “…there 
is some worry that information such as attendance records will affect financial decisions in other 
domains”. Credit scores (created elsewhere) are commonly used as an input for hiring algorithms, 
“even though connections between credit history and work capability are dubious at best” (Caplan, 
2018:7). The credit agency, Experian, is making its demographic segmentation software called 
Mosaic (2019) and data available to local government agencies in the UK where it is used in a variety 
of ways, such as for risk assessment of defendants in court cases (Dencik, Hintz and Cable, 2019). 
As a consequence, the crude labelling of people that might be appropriate for market segmentation in 
commerce is propagated to local government agencies that make potentially life-changing decisions 
about individual citizens.  
These practices result in ‘networked harm’. As explained in the employment algorithmic primer 
(Rosenblat et al., 2014c), “[h]arms from networked information stem from the sudden availability of 
large amounts of data on individuals that is gathered and shared beyond their control. Legal remedies 
for individual harm are not structured in a way that accounts for networked harms” (pg. 5).  
 
2.4. Summary  
 In summary, our critical insights into the growing literature on automated algorithmic decision-
making in transformative services reveal wide-ranging discriminatory and other harmful societal 
effects. Moreover, these insights raise “novel questions about objectivity, legitimacy, matters of 
inclusion, the black-boxing of accountability, and the systemic effects and unintended consequences 
of algorithmic decision-making” (Schultze, et al., 2018:7). What makes the raising of these questions 
even more challenging, we argue, is the invisible nature of these harmful effects. Through datafication 
practices, algorithms are starting to perform new worlds2, by creating and enacting “new behaviours, 
new expressions, new actors and new realities” (Muller, 2015:29) and exerting power over us (Beer, 
2017) through these effects (Diakopoulos, 2013). While the harmful effects of datafication practices 
and ‘algorithmic doing’ (Introna, 2016) continue to be reported in the literature by more and more 
studies, there is a paucity of research that engages with a theoretical explanation of how algorithms 
perform these effects. An evident lack of IS studies in this area makes it urgent that the IS community 
engage with these questions, taking a critical approach, rather than the currently prevailing 
celebratory approach. With this objective in mind, in the next section we propose a transformative 
redefinition (Alvesson and Deetz 2000) of the harmful social effects of automated algorithmic 
decision-making as algorithmic pollution. 
 
 
3. Algorithmic Pollution 
To articulate and justify the notion of algorithmic pollution, we ground our elaboration in the long-
established concept of social pollution, which has been used in different fields, including social 
sciences, law (both in research and in practice), education, political and cultural studies. The concept 
of social pollution originates from the concept of moral pollution in theological and cultural studies 
(Douglas, 1966, 1969, 1975). Both concepts – social and moral pollution – appeared in the research 
literature and the practice of law long before our “contemporary understanding of pollution as a 
uniquely environmental phenomenon” (Nagle, 2009, p.39). 
Drawing upon Douglas’ anthropological understanding of pollution, Sarine (2012) shifts the locus 
of pollution to harm. Focusing on discrimination as a specific form of harm, Sarine (2012) defines 
social pollution “as encompassing systematic discrimination created by implicit bias” (p.1359). 
Sarine’s (2012) interpretation of social pollution-as-harm is not unique. Our multidisciplinary 
literature review reveals numerous other examples of social pollution interpreted as harm. For 
example, forms of social pollution include racial discrimination and racism (Vesely-Flad 2017; 
 
2 A vivid example of algorithms, or more precisely datafication practices, performing new worlds is the story of My 
Shed (Butler, 2017). A fake restaurant, made into a top restaurant on Trip Advisor through a deliberate datafication 
experiment (scoring), led to the opening of a physical restaurant in the author’s shed. 
Norman, 2004; Bhattacharyya et al. 2002; Sherman and Clore, 2009), political judgment (Inbar and 
Pizzaro, 2014), various forms of workplace maltreatment such as bullying, harassment and gender 
bias (Fedorova and Menshikova, 2014; Paradis et al. 2014; Pietrulewicz, 2016; Dunham, 2017), 
pollution of privacy by mass surveillance (Froomkin, 2015), as well as forms of pollution in 
education, caused by the internet (Hope, 2008) or test scores (Haladyna and Nolen, 1991). Recently, 
the ideas from social pollution, in particular the notion of pollution as a harm to people rather than 
pollution as discharge, have been used to argue the case for visual pollution, which is now formally 
recognized as a new type of environmental pollution (Nagle, 2009, Wakil, et al. 2019) 
Following Sarine (2012), Vesely-Flad (2017), Nagle (2009) and other contemporary scholars of 
social pollution, our notion of algorithmic pollution is based on the idea of social pollution-as-harm. 
As mentioned earlier, we use the term algorithmic pollution, not as an analogy or a metaphor, but to 
signify a new kind of social pollution of the human/digital environment. In doing so, we also draw 
inspiration and encouragement from Nagle’s (2009) argument about the need to recognise new types 
of pollution by looking beyond the narrow interpretation of environmental pollution. As Nagle (2009) 
explains: “pollution has always had dual meaning: a broad reference to all sorts of effects upon human 
environments, and a narrow focus upon natural environments” (p.6). In this research we take the 
former broad meaning of pollution as a reference to harmful effects and recognize algorithmic 
pollution as a social pollution caused by AADM and datafication. In particular, we argue that 
algorithmic pollution is a new form of digital social pollution, distinct from other forms of social 
pollutions previously studied in social sciences. 
When AADM, underpinned by datafication, leads to harmful effects we call this phenomenon 
algorithmic pollution and define it as follows: 
 
Algorithmic pollution is a new form of social pollution which denotes the unjustified, unfair, 
discriminatory, and other harmful effects of automated algorithmic decision-making for 
individuals, their families, groups of people, communities, organizations, sections of the 
population, and society at large. 
 
Algorithmic pollution is an appropriate and important framing of the negative effects of AI and 
algorithms for IS research and practice for several reasons. First, while it assumes a baseline position 
that AI and algorithms can be a force for good with a significant potential for positive business and 
social impacts, it recognizes that there are both intended and unintended, yet harmful consequences 
for individuals, communities and society. Second, it gives visibility to and promotes understandings 
of these consequences which have not been recognized or expressed in public debates. Third, it 
creates awareness and provides a reminder for adopters and advocates of automated algorithmic 
decision-making to consider not only the potential benefits but also the risks of serious harmful effects 
that may arise as unintended side-effects of AADM initiatives that “often serve legitimate social 
purposes” (Sarine, 2012, p.1383). Fourth, the notion of algorithmic pollution signals the need for 
society-wide monitoring of the effects of algorithmic decision-making and identifying and addressing 
harm to individuals and communities. Finally, the increased awareness and the attention to evidence 
of algorithmic pollution may help instigate public debates about the future of decision-making in 
transformative services. 
Learning the lessons from the history of pollution of all kinds, we understand why naming a new 
pollution phenomenon matters for the recognition and examination of its consequences (Nagle, 2009, 
Wakil, et al. 2019). We further emphasize that our proposal and articulation of the concept of 
algorithmic pollution as harms to individuals, communities and ultimately society, performed by 
automated algorithmic decision-making, represents a transformative redefinition (Alvesson and 
Deetz, 2000) as it undermines the dominant discourses that neglect or discount these harms and also 
encourages alternative ways of seeing and understanding reality enacted by algorithms and 
datafication. This is an important contribution of our critical research: it encourages alternative ways 
of seeing a phenomenon, in our case, the overall effects of automated algorithmic decision-making, 
and promotes the setting of new agendas in both research and public debates. In the following section, 
we examine in greater depth how algorithmic pollution is performed and how it is spreading.  
 
4. A critical performative view of algorithmic pollution  
To understand and explain how algorithmic pollution arises and how it is performed, we adopt a 
critical performative perspective (Barad, 2007; Introna, 2019). This perspective allows us to expose 
the ontological assumptions underlying AADM and the ways in which the execution of algorithms 
enacts the subjects of decisions and reconstructs the sociomaterial environment. 
The ontological assumptions underlying AADM, and specifically those about the subjects of 
decision-making (clients, citizens, children at risk, offenders, welfare recipients, students, and others) 
– what they are, how they are represented by data sets and how these data sets are used to compute 
decisions about them – are often taken for granted and as such, not discussed by organizations that 
adopt AADM. Revealing and exploring these assumptions is not only a matter for academic debate - 
it is, we argue, fundamental to understanding how the execution of AADM systems interfere in and 
perform reality and how the harms done to individuals and communities remain a non-issue, rejected 
or tacitly accepted as inevitable and justified in the business or public sector organizations that deploy 
them.  Questioning ontological assumptions and the ways AADM technologies are designed, 
deployed, and executed in specific sociomaterial environment is also highly important for IS and all 
other researchers who are concerned with and seek to explain their harmful human and social 
implications (for which any responsibility is yet-to-be taken).  
AADM assumes that individuals that are subjects of decision-making exist as externally bounded 
and self-contained entities with given properties. To acquire data about relevant properties of the 
targeted individuals (‘entities’), algorithms draw, as we discussed above, from various available data 
sources that are consolidated per individual (Bucher 2018; Clarke, 2019a; Marsh, 2019) as well as 
proxy, inferred and unrelated data, often produced by other algorithms in other contexts and for 
unknown purposes. In addition, targeted individuals are not aware of such data collection, nor do they 
give permission for the use of such data. Nevertheless, when adopting AADM, organizations take for 
granted that the collected data sets about individuals ‘represent’ them sufficiently accurately and 
fairly enough so that correct and fair decisions are made (Gitelman 2013; Bucher, 2018; Dencik, 
Redden et al. 2019; Dencik, Hintz and Cable, 2019; Marsh, 2019; Cheney-Lippold, 2018). 
Consequently, organizations are confident that they can use such data for automating their decision-
making (Seaver, 2013; Kitchin, 2017): for instance, to calculate scores (risk scores; credit scores); to 
make predictions (the likelihood of failing at a university or of reoffending); to determine sentencing 
in court proceedings; to shortlist job applicants; and, to decide on loan approvals.  
Further, to automate decision-making processes in transformative services it is assumed that the 
required knowledge possessed by human decision-makers in a given domain, can be ‘acquired’, 
‘inferred’, and ‘contained’ by algorithms. In other words, through training based on past data sets in 
specific domains of decision-making, AADM is assumed to acquire relevant knowledge to predict 
the outcomes for new cases (such as those committing offences, job applicants, or social security 
claimants) and thus make appropriate decisions. Irrespective of the complexity and equivocality of 
knowledge and the decision-making process and the ways in which human beings (such as judges, 
recruiters or social security case workers) come to their decision in any concrete case, AADM is 
assumed to be able to ‘replicate’ the decision-making based on learning from past data sets (i.e., 
decisions in past cases) and even outperform human decision-makers (Baer and Kamalnath 2017; 
Kitchin 2017). 
This suggests that AADM in transformative services is based on two important assumptions. First, 
that decision-making practices, involving situated knowledges, professional discourses, cultural-
historic experiences and moral and ethical reasoning can be abstracted and generalized (patterned) 
based on a sufficiently large number of past cases. Consequently, achieving the desired quality 
(accuracy, fairness) of decision-making by AADM becomes a question of the size and quality of data 
sets of past decisions. Additionally, quality can be improved by advancing the learning algorithms 
themselves. AADM thus assumes that complex and value-laden practices of transformative services 
are, as David (2019) argues, reducible to opaque, incomprehensible correlations derived from masses 
of past data, a learning that seems unlimited and unattainable by human beings.  
The second assumption underpinning AADM is that future decisions will largely resemble past 
decisions. This ignores the novelty that shows up in any new case, making it unique, and uniquely 
challenging for decision-makers. In any domain of transformative services, practices also change and 
evolve over time, responding for example to changes in society, advancement of professional 
knowledge and regulatory changes. Recalling Bergson (1911), Maria David observes that the “future 
is not a permanently recomposed past” (2019: 892).  
To summarize, the ontology underlying AADM in practice is an entitative, substantialist ontology 
that assumes the separate existence of human beings and decision-making technologies, with each 
considered bounded, self-contained entities (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2016). Even more radically, it is a 
perfect mechanistic, reductionist ontology that exiles decision-makers and their sociomaterial 
practices. The sociomaterial practices of decision-making as collective, knowledgeable doings 
(Gherardi, 2019) are black-boxed, reduced to algorithms that only ‘know’ and deal with datafied 
individuals (data sets) as the objects of decision-making. The complex, dynamic, and uncertain reality 
of decision-making practices in transformative services is thus reduced to a mechanical, rational, 
clock-like working reality. Such an ontology provides grounds for the belief that AADM is wholly 
independent of and exterior to knowledge of the actors in sociomaterial environments in which 
algorithms are deployed and executed. AADM is therefore assumed as an independent, external factor 
in this environment - one that improves efficiency, correctness and fairness of decision-making while 
reducing its costs. If this is so, why should we be worried about such an ontology and why is it 
relevant for understanding algorithmic pollution? 
While such an ontology might seem common-sensical, it is, we agree with Introna (2019), in many 
ways misleading. It prevents us from understanding the “radical openness of sociomaterial becoming” 
(Introna, 2019:317) of that which is assumed as pre-given and fixed – the human/social, the 
technological, and their entanglements in sociomaterial practices. Moreover, such an ontology 
underlies the claim that automated algorithmic decision-making is objective, fair, ethical and moral 
which thus justifies any ‘impacts’ on subjects made by the AADM (technologies) as objective and 
fair.  In other words, AADM that is designed (and continually improved) as objective, fair, ethical 
and moral is a guarantor that its execution performs (equally) objective, fair, ethical and moral 
decisions. When evidence shows that this actually is not the case and that biases, discrimination and 
unfair decisions are made, there is still an assumption, held by many as Gangadharan & Niklas (2019) 
observe, that this is a technical problem that could be fixed by improving algorithms and de-biasing 
data by technical means. For instance, the long-established traditional stream of research on 
Algorithmic Fairness, Accountability and Transparency in Machine Learning (FAT-ML) is seeking 
to develop technical solutions that would ensure the desired qualities of algorithmic decision-making 
and its outcomes are achieved (see for example Zemel et al. 2013; Celis et al. 2018; Bellamy et al. 
2018). Calling it highly influential, Gangadharan & Niklas (2019) argue that the mainstream FAT-
ML field3  focuses on identifying criteria to assess if machine learning is fair, while failing to 
 
3 While we focus on the mainstream FAT-ML research, it is important to acknowledge its emerging streams. For example, 
the 2020 ACM conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency (now known as FAccT), has broadened its scope 
to include “ethics and policy”, with papers investigating the social good (Washington and Kuo, 2020), collective freedom 
(Terzis, 2020), and algorithmic targeting of social policies (Noriega-Campera, et al., 2020). While the underlying 
ontology may still be one that favours technology-based solutions, it is encouraging to see a wider concern for society. It 
allows for recognition of harms done to individuals (the subjects of decision-making) and for society at large, and may 
thus assist in addressing algorithmic pollution.  
 
articulate their underlying assumptions about antidiscrimination or fairness (assumptions which are, 
in themselves, value-based). This suggests that the ontology underpinning AADM prevents 
recognition of harms done to individuals (i.e., the subjects of decision-making) and thus limits and 
potentially disables our understanding of algorithmic pollution. 
By adopting a critical performative perspective grounded in the ontology of becoming (Barad, 
2003; Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2016; Introna, 2019), we are able to expose how the execution of AADM 
performs the subjects (i.e., datafied individuals) in the ongoing flow of their sociomaterial becoming. 
To do that we draw attention to the reconfiguration of sociomaterial practices of transformative 
services through ‘intra-acting’ triggered by the execution of AADM. We use Barad’s (2007) concept 
of intra-acting to describe how actors (subjects and objects) emerge from, rather than precede, the 
relations that produce them (see e.g., Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowski and Scott, 2008; Cecez-
Kecmanovic et al., 2014). When algorithms are executed and decisions implemented – social security 
payments determined and administered; court sentences issued; loans granted/declined – the intra-
actions are triggered in targeted sociomaterial environments. Through such intra-acting, the 
individuals who are the subjects of these algorithmic decisions are performed in ways assumed by 
the algorithm and made real as part of a reconfiguration of the sociomaterial environment.  By 
focusing on the performing and reconfiguration we can now explain how algorithmic pollution is 
generated in sociomaterial environments.  
First, the intra-acting triggered by algorithmic decisions involves the clash of the entitative, 
mechanistic ontology (assumptions) underlying AADM and the real-life, complex and dynamic 
sociomaterial practices in which it is deployed and executed. While this ontological clash is not 
observable it is experienced by the subjects of AADM and also becomes revealed in practice when, 
for instance, citizens or neighbourhoods are wrongly identified as high-risk based on past police data 
and proxy and inferred data (Ferguson 2017; Cino 2018); or when court sentencing is evidently 
discriminatory (Caplan et al. 2018; Denick, Redden et al., 2019). We suggest that the clash of 
ontology underlying AADM and the real-life practices (purportedly reflected in the algorithm) 
enacted through intra-acting is central to understanding and explaining the unfolding of algorithmic 
pollution.  
Second, such a clash of ontologies produces performative effects. Through intra-acting in 
particular sociomaterial practices, AADM performs individuals: concrete individuals become what 
the algorithm claims they are – unsuccessful job applicants, ‘failing’ students, high-risk citizens, or 
security suspects. The repeated execution of AADM thus continually reconstructs actual people – 
employees, clients, citizens – in the image of datafied individuals. When such performing creates 
harmful material implications for such individuals (and communities) algorithmic pollution is 
generated. Moreover, pollution continues to spread through systems of algorithms, resulting in 
ongoing networked harm that is perpetually amplified, such that, for example, ‘failing students’ 
become ‘unsuccessful job applicants’ or ‘high-risk’ citizens. Harm is spread across different contexts 
in a hard-to-trace network of interconnected transformative services – all designed to help the same 
individual. Thus, networked algorithmic pollution ends up amplifying harm, and performing new 
forms of algorithmic pollution. 
Third, algorithms not only perform datafied individuals (i.e., digital versions of individuals), they 
also reconfigure their relations with institutions – companies, governments, police, courts, social 
security departments, and the like. The intra-acting triggered by repeated execution of AADM in 
sociomaterial environments is materially constrained by mechanical, one-way transactions, that often 
disable and exclude individuals’ ability to reply, complain or give feedback. In the case of court 
sentencing, or police profiling and targeting of citizens that have not committed any crime (Ferguson 
2017; Caplan et al. 2018), individuals are given little or no opportunity to object to and demonstrate 
that an algorithmic decision isn’t right or isn’t legal (O’Neil 2016; Eubanks 2018; Benjamin, 2019). 
In such cases AADM reconfigures relations between citizens and institutions, often transforming 
them into coercive power relations and strict control mechanisms. In the words of Benjamin “[w]e 
should acknowledge that most people are forced to live inside someone else’s imagination, and one 
of the things we have to come to grips with is how the nightmares that many people are forced to 
endure are really the underside of elite fantasies about efficiency, profit, safety and social control” 
(Johnson, 2020 p.1.) 
As algorithmic decision-making permeates transformative services, sociomaterial practices get 
reconfigured: targeted subjects become performed as particular individuals (risky, suspect, or guilty) 
subordinated to institutions that efficiently exercise power over them through algorithmic acting 
(Diakopoulos 2013; Eubanks, 2018; Keddell, 2019). In the case of network harm, this algorithmic 
acting propagates and amplifies harm across different contexts. By deploying AADM and replacing 
human decision-making practices, institutions reconstruct their sociomaterial environments in the 
image of an embedded economic-rational logic concerned solely with efficiency and cost cutting 
(Bucher, 2018). Algorithmic harm thus becomes both generated and generative, causing harm now 
and harm in the future.  
 
5. Addressing algorithmic pollution through transformative actions  
As the use of AADM proliferates and algorithmic pollution rapidly advances there is a sense of 
urgency to act promptly to address the damage done and to prevent or mitigate further polluting. As 
the first step, we recognize the need to start from a fundamental question: What kind of problem is 
algorithmic pollution? Our theorisation has surfaced the existing ontological clashes, which offer 
different answers to this question. For example, some researchers including those from the traditional 
stream of FAT-ML, as Gangadharan & Niklas (2019) observe, see the problem of algorithmic harm 
primarily as a technical issue – one that can be addressed by better quality data and more accurate 
and transparent algorithms. Consequently, the solutions suggested in the related literature (see for 
example Zemel et al. 2013; Celis et al. 2018; Bellamy et al. 2018) are also grounded in a technical 
rationality. Contrary to this view, we argue that algorithmic pollution should be treated similarly to 
other types of social pollution and as a matter of social justice, as discussed earlier4. Following our 
critical performative perspective, we propose here possible transformative actions5 to address 
algorithmic pollution. While we discuss these transformative actions individually it should be noted 
that they are interrelated and overlapping. 
- Prevention of algorithmic pollution 
This transformative action focuses on the key question: What can we do to stop algorithmic 
pollution from occurring in the first place?  
While answering this complex question requires further research, we argue that the very concept 
of AADM that excludes human involvement, oversight and responsibility should be questioned. 
Especially in the highly sensitive context of transformative services, which are, as we discussed, 
critical for the well-being of citizens and communities. The ontological clash among AADM systems 
and concrete decision-making practices, that ultimately leads to social pollution of sociomaterial 
environments, cannot be remedied by technological and data improvements alone. There is no reason 
to question the best intentions in designing the technologies and in using the best available data. 
However, no matter how advanced and sophisticated the technologies become and how much data 
sources improve, the automation of decision-making processes that are complex, uncertain, and 
equivocal remains an elusive goal (as Jarrahi, 2018; Davenport and Kirby, 2016; among many others, 
show). There are already calls to abandon the idea of automating decision-making and instead rely 
on human-machine collaboration in decision making processes. Thus, instead of using AI to replace 
 
4 This argument is also inspired by pioneering work of an emerging group of multidisciplinary researchers (such as 
(Keddell, 2019; Marda, 2019; Dencik, Hintz, Redden and Trere, 2019; Gillingham, 2019; Sloan and Warner, 2020; 
Zavrsnik, 2020; Mann, 2020). 
 
5 Although they are both using the word “transformative”, the notion of “transformative actions” from critical research 
(Avesson and Deetz, 2000) is unrelated to its use in “transformative services”.  
humans (knowledge workers, managers) and automate decision making processes, Jarrahi (2018), for 
example, argues that ‘human-machine symbiosis’6 and collaborative decision making are more 
promising. To this, we add the importance of considering a particular context of transformative 
services. 
As previously discussed, decision-making processes in transformative services are characterized 
by complexity, uncertainty and equivocality, often involving ethical and moral judgements. Uniquely 
human faculties such as intuitive and creative thinking, holistic vision, ethical and moral reasoning, 
emotional intelligence, compassion and empathy, and the ability to get deep insights into and assess 
intangible social aspects, are indispensable in this context. On the other hand, computational 
information processing, mathematical modelling, AI and analytics are far superior in dealing with 
large data sets and complexity of decision-making, compared to humans. These are the arguments for 
proposing human-machine collaboration in which humans and AI technologies would have 
complementary roles, drawing on their comparative strengths (Davenport, 2016; Jarrahi, 2018). 
Instead of automating human decision-making, the role of AI technologies would be to augment and 
enhance human intelligence and advance decision-making processes above and beyond what is 
possible by either humans or machines on their own. In the words of Ginni Rometty, the president of 
IBM, “this is about man and machine, not man vs. machine. This is an era—really, an era that will 
play out for decades in front of us.” (Murphy 2017). 
Indeed, this is a long-term prospect for imagining, exploring, developing and testing in practice 
human-machine symbiotic working and cooperative decision-making. It would require a fundamental 
rethinking of decision-making problems in transformative services and an exploration of 
complementary roles that both humans and technologies could, and should, play in the context of 
transformative services.  For any type of decision making the forms of human-algorithm cooperative 
working and acting have to be examined together with possible configurations of agency distribution 
while preserving human responsibility for the outcomes in sociomaterial practices. Possible 
configurations have to be tested and monitored in practice with particular sensitivity to the fairness, 
ethicality and morality of outcomes. Further, we expect that any cooperative form of human-machine 
decision-making would evolve in time. Through collaborative work with AI technologies, human 
actors (knowledge workers, managers, citizens) will learn about these technologies, what they can 
(and cannot) do, and also about the relevant data sets, their quality and their ethical use. Given rapid 
developments in AI capabilities, decision-makers would also need to become more knowledgeable 
about new analytic techniques in order to be able to explore new opportunities for advancing decision-
making processes (e.g., new configurations of task allocation and agency distribution in a particular 
context).  
While adopting human-machine partnerships and cooperative decision-making, organizations 
would need to take full responsibility for the outcomes and their social implications. Any organization 
providing transformative services to citizens, including government social security and other 
agencies, hospitals, schools, police departments, or courts, would continue to act in accordance with 
the norms, rules, and regulations established in society. Holding organizations accountable for their 
actions, which translates to individual decision-maker’s responsibility in their specific domains 
across an organization, is critical for preventing algorithmic pollution.   
The adoption of human-machine symbiotic working and cooperative decision-making that we 
propose as a key transformative action to prevent algorithmic pollution would also, as the above 
discussion shows, advance the decision-making processes beyond what would be possible by AADM 
or human decision-making alone. For such a transformative action, however, there are no ready-made 
simple solutions as to how decision-making tasks would be shared between human and algorithm and 
how they might work cooperatively and make decisions in a particular context. This opens a new 
domain of research into configurations of human-machine cooperative decision-making in the context 
of transformative services and their evolution over time. Emerging research questions, among many, 
 
6 This is inspired by the original idea of Licklider (1960) from MIT Labs. 
include: What are the distinctly human roles and responsibilities in transformative services? How can 
AI and analytic processing be employed to augment and enhance human capacities: How can they 
together make decisions not only more efficiently, but also in a socially responsible, ethical and moral 
way? 
Informed by the social pollution literature, we see important steps in this direction. The 
anthropological notion of pollution also draws attention to a system of values (Douglas, 1966).  For 
instance, in designing and practicing human-machine cooperative decision-making there needs to be 
recognition and articulation of competing values (e.g., efficiency and cost reduction versus care for 
people) and understanding how these values are guiding the decision-making process. Different 
scenarios can be experimented with (using algorithmic calculations and predictions) to assess impacts 
on these values, that would ultimately inform decisions.  
Finally, in line with a number of social pollution scholars who advocate elimination of social 
pollution (Sarine, 2012), we would like to emphasize that the goal of prevention of algorithmic 
pollution should be elimination, rather than living with an ‘acceptable level of harm’. Adopting the 
social justice perspective, we propose that any level of harm is still harm, and as such should not be 
tolerated in a civil society.  
- Detection of algorithmic pollution 
The transformative action of detection focuses on the key question: How do we know algorithmic 
pollution has occurred?  
Based on our research, we suggest that detection of algorithmic pollution needs to consider 
society-wide datafication practices. Moreover, detection should not be implemented by or left to any 
single authority, including government legislators. This is due to the complex and unknowable nature 
of society-wide datafication, with harmful effects being propagated, amalgamated and amplified on 
an ongoing basis and in unknowable ways. Instead, we argue, detection of algorithmic pollution needs 
to be an ongoing, society-wide initiative, enacted through systematic means, and made visible through 
appropriate channels.  
Therefore, further IS research is needed to understand what these detection mechanisms entail and 
how they might be implemented. Here we see two IS research challenges: (i) society-wide tracing of 
algorithmic pollution through systems of algorithms, following the trails of datafication practices, 
and (ii) society-wide detection and reporting of algorithmic pollution, which needs to be ongoing and 
systematic. Although more research is required, the existing literature offers some starting points. For 
example, the emerging research on data activism and civil society actions (ACLU, 2016; Gutierrez, 
2018; Datactive n/d, NotMyDebt, n/d) point to the need for grass-root reporting of harm. We also 
observe that the current initiatives of various data activist groups are isolated and focused on one-
directional change through activism, including collective pressure for change and/or legal actions.  
Inspired by these insights, we see the need for a large-scale society-wide information system that 
could meet the previously identified IS research challenges by enabling a coordinated grass-root 
reporting of algorithmic pollution by the affected stakeholders and/or those who have the power and 
resources to act on their behalf. Further characteristics of this type of systems are discussed below in 
relation to mitigation of algorithmic pollution. 
- Redress of algorithmic pollution 
The transformative action of redress focuses on the key question: What can we do to redress harm 
suffered by individuals exposed to algorithmic pollution on a case-by-case basis? 
Our research reveals that algorithmic pollution involves different types of harm. When harms are 
detected they need to be addressed. We recognize the redress of algorithmic harm to be a 
multidisciplinary challenge that is currently discussed by legal scholars and practitioners, such as 
Zavrsnik (2019), Zalnieriute et al. (2019), social scientists (Keddell, 2019), social justice researchers 
(Marda, 2019), as well as multidisciplinary researchers (Metcalf et al., 2021). The questions about 
how to determine the level of harm and who is responsible for the assessment and redress of harm, 
as Metcalf et al. (2021) explain, are domain specific and regulated by different norms about what 
constitutes harm. We consider these important questions to be outside of our collective IS expertise. 
Instead, in this paper we focus on the IS perspective that we observe is currently missing from this 
multidisciplinary discourse about the redress of harm. 
Here, we see the important IS research challenges that are again focused on datafication practices, 
in relation to individuals. They could be captured by the following research questions: How can we 
trace and disentangle ‘datafied individuals’, back to the sources of data and datafication practices 
used to construct the individual’s datafied representation? Which of these datafication steps caused 
and/or contributed to algorithmic harm experienced by an individual? How can we disentangle 
networked harm, in order to trace and determine responsibilities when harm is the result of a system 
of algorithms? Who is responsible for networked harms that are created as more than the sum of 
individual services? 
Broad (2018) describes a possible first step toward redressing algorithmic harm: “Perhaps at the 
minimum, any organisation deploying AI systems in decision-making contexts should be required to 
provide documentation publicly, and to purchasers of their system, about the data they’ve used to 
train their system: when it was collected, for what purpose, the characteristics it includes, its 
limitations and omissions.” (p.52). The same practice could be also used to the tracing and detection 
of algorithmic pollution. 
- Mitigation of algorithmic pollution 
The transformative action of mitigation focuses on the key question: What can we do to address 
harm involved in algorithmic pollution at the societal level? 
In seeking possible answers to this question, we observe a growing number of various AI ethics 
frameworks and guiding principles. They are being generated by commercial enterprises, activist 
bodies, international organisations, and government agencies - see for example those created by the 
Australian Human Rights Commission (2019), the Toronto Declaration (Brandom, 2018), the 
European Commission (2019) and the United Nations (2020). 
While these initiatives are of tremendous importance, we also observe a serious limitation, i.e., 
they are primarily focused on the developers of new AI-enabled algorithms. As such, they do not 
address ongoing algorithmic pollution and related issues of society-wide datafication, which may still 
occur in spite of best intentions and actions of a single organisation. 
Drawing from the work by social justice theorist Nancy Fraser (2008), we propose that mitigation 
of algorithmic pollution requires an ongoing dialogical process, between a civil society track with 
grass-root insights into harm experienced by individuals and an institutional track (e.g., government 
regulators), with legislative power and the capacity to make decisions.  
In the case of algorithmic harm, we also observe the ongoing tension created by mutually 
competing goals of different stakeholders, such as efficiency and cost reduction en masse, versus the 
need to prevent and mitigate harmful effects of algorithmic decision-making. Consequently, we argue 
the need for independent regulatory oversight of transformative services with the authority to act in 
cases of algorithmic harm as well as having the power to influence the formation and content of 
policies and regulations. This idea is further supported by recent research by Sun and Gershik (2019) 
and recommendations made by the US Government Accountability Office (2019). They both argue 
for the establishment of an oversight agency with relevant expertise to deal with society-wide issues 
of algorithmic harm.   
The need for an ongoing, society-wide, dialogical process of mitigation, overseen by an 
independent regulator brings us back to an IS research challenge concerning the design and 
implementation a society-wide information system to support such a process. This in turn leads to a 
number of research questions: What kind of IS is it? How might we design such a system and who 
should be involved? Will it require new IS design methodologies (for example, community-based 
approaches)? What is the most effective way to implement such an IS to support an ongoing society-
wide dialogue? How will it support the algorithm mitigation work of an independent regulator? 
- Education about algorithmic pollution 
Fundamental to prevention, detection, redress and mitigation of algorithmic pollution is a 
transformative action of education. First, there is a clear need for education of managers, developers 
and, in particular policy makers and regulators (Caplan et al. 2018) about algorithms and their use in 
AADM. We argue that these stakeholders need to be educated about the myths and limitations of 
‘data objectivity’ and ‘accurate representation’ of ‘entities’ (i.e., datafied individuals) that are used 
and produced by algorithms in the area of human services. As Broad (2018) advises, we can learn 
from anthropologists, sociologists, historians, librarians, social workers, health care administrators 
and others who have been collecting and analyzing data about humans for some time. 
Second, it is also important to educate various stakeholders about the notion of fairness and 
‘correctness’ of algorithms. In particular, they need to be made aware of the notion of fairness in 
social justice, which is much broader than fairness in statistics and computer science (Keddell, 2019). 
Moreover, as social justice scholars now argue, the widely-used ethical frameworks of fairness, 
accountability, and transparency (FAT-ML) of algorithms do not go far enough, and need to be 
augmented with the concepts of justice and human rights when considering AADM in transformative 
services (Keddell, 2019; Gurses et al., 2019; Naranayan, 2018; Zavrsnik, 2019, 2020; Marda, 2019; 
Chouldechova, 2017).  
These insights from the social justice literature, combined with an awareness of a growing 
influence of techno-solutionism, (Morozov, 2013; Zavrsnik, 2019), may enable managers, developers 
and other stakeholders to better understand the important limitations of the widespread claims about 
the superiority of algorithms over human decision makers, in their own contexts. This in turn, may 
empower them to engage in important conversations, especially when dealing with third parties 
selling their algorithmic solutions and data (i.e., datafied individuals) to governments and other 
providers of social services.  
Third, inspired by prior research in social pollution (Sarine, 2012), we see the need for education 
that goes beyond the content (e.g., what are the algorithms, what they can and cannot do), to include 
broader societal context, including existing systemic and other structural injustices. This is also 
echoed by an emerging stream of FAT-ML researchers such as Benjamin (2019), Gebru (2019, 2020), 
and Crawford (2019). 
Forth, to be effective, education about algorithmic pollution needs to empower, not just inform. It 
needs to empower knowledge workers and anyone working in collaboration with algorithms to deal 
with new societal moral and ethical issues arising from the ongoing tensions created by competing 
goals of different legitimate stakeholders, from the position of responsibility for welfare of others, 
personal integrity and compassion for our shared humanity. It also needs to empower citizens and 
other societal stakeholders for an ongoing society-wide dialogue about algorithmic pollution.  
The previous discussion leads to a number of research questions related to education about 
algorithmic pollution: How might we design, implement, and evaluate education about algorithmic 
pollution? Who should be involved? Who should be responsible for its implementation? How to 
design effective pedagogical methods and practices to educate a wide range of stakeholders about 
fairness from the perspective of social justice and human rights? How to ‘educate to empower’ 
knowledge-workers, managers, citizens and other stakeholders for an ongoing society-wide dialogue 
about algorithmic pollution? How to make this education embedded, contextualised and ‘living’, to 
enable co-existence with ever-changing algorithms (Schultze, et al. 2018) such that human agents are 
responsible, and in charge?  
Finally, the five transformative actions of prevention, detection, redress, mitigation and education 
taken together not only open up new research challenges for IS scholars, they also invite us to reflect 
on ‘the how’ of doing research on algorithmic pollution. We emphasise the importance of conducting 
such research from foundations of care and compassion for our shared humanity. In doing so, we join 
Raman and McClelland’s (2019) call for bringing compassion into IS research. In this case, both 
when researching algorithmic pollution and also when participating in transformative actions to 
prevent, detect, redress, mitigate, and educate about algorithmic harm. 
 
6. Concluding remarks and a call for action 
By focusing on the unintended harmful societal effects of automated algorithmic decision-making 
in the context of transformative services, we have put forward a claim - and provided evidence - that 
these harmful effects constitute a new type of widespread, hidden, and largely unregulated digital 
pollution, which we name algorithmic pollution. Building upon well-established research on social 
pollution, we recognise algorithmic pollution as a new kind of social pollution and offer a theoretical 
explanation of how it is performed. By using the term algorithmic pollution in a non-metaphorical 
sense, we foreground harms performed by automated algorithmic decision-making as a new type of 
largely invisible, wide-spread social digital pollution. We thus make it visible and raise public 
awareness of its dangers, calling for urgent action.  
Our main theoretical contributions come from: (1) critical insights into, and a transformative 
redefinition of the harmful effects of AADM as algorithmic pollution; (2) novel theoretical 
explanation of how algorithmic pollution is performed in sociomaterial environments, using a critical 
performative approach; (3) proposed transformative actions of prevention, detection, redress, and 
mitigation of, and education about, algorithmic pollution; and (4) identification of associated future 
research challenges for the information systems (IS) community. Our main practical contributions 
include: (1) drawing public awareness and recognition of a new type of digital social pollution; (2) 
enabling broader understanding of how algorithmic pollution is performed and how its consequences 
spread; and (iii) motivating different actors to engage in transformative actions. 
It is important to reiterate the positive intentions of those organisations wishing to innovate 
transformative services through AI and AADM. These services are often critical for the wellbeing of 
the most vulnerable members of our society. Ultimately, by making algorithmic pollution visible, we 
aim to help organisations adopting algorithmic decision-making in their transformative services to 
better achieve their positive intentions of improving the wellbeing of service users. We thus recognize 
that algorithms undoubtedly have the potential to provide society with significant benefits (e.g., 
healthcare, education, fraud detection). Therefore, this paper is not a treatise against algorithms. Far 
from it. As Wachter-Boettcher (2017:11-12) points out “[i]t’s not that digitizing the world is 
inherently bad. But the more technology becomes embedded in all aspects of life, the more it matters 
whether that technology is biased, alienating, or harmful.”  
By deliberately using the word ‘pollution’ to name this new phenomenon, we aim to make it easier 
for all of us (research communities, policy makers and the general public) to relate to these effects 
(both intellectually and emotionally) in order to understand the seriousness of the current situation. 
If algorithms are our future, then understanding, and continually looking for new ways to prevent, 
detect, redress and mitigate algorithmic pollution as a new kind of social pollution, may help us to 
maintain and even improve our individual and collective wellbeing, as well as our humanity. 
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